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Just Say No: Minimizing Limited




"I don't have authority to pay that much [or accept that little]." "I'm not
authorized to do that." "Although that sounds plausible, I'm afraid my client
[boss, company, board, agency head] won't go for it." "Someone else in the
company [agency, institution, organization] will have to make that
decision." These and similar statements of limited authority occur during
negotiations. When they occur, limited authority claims affect whether
negotiations continue and what outcomes result. Claiming limited authority
lets negotiators influence, delay, and prevent agreements.'
Limited authority claims also present challenges when negotiations are
mediated. Best understood as assisted and enhanced negotiation,2 mediation
has been practiced for centuries and found in some form in most of the
world's cultures.3 Mediation allows persons to negotiate in the presence of
: Professor of Law, Trustee Research Fellow, and Director, Institute for Dispute Resolution, Levin
College of Law, at the University of Florida. Thanks to Kelly Ann May for research assistance,
Joshua Farmer for technical assistance, and the Levin College of Law for a summer writing grant.
1. See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK, NEGOTIATION PRACTICE 47 (1984) (nature and extent of
authority affects negotiations); CHESTER L. KARRASS, GIVE AND TAKE: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 96-97 (1974) (limited authority can be a source of
bargaining power); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 146-47 (1982)
(effects of knowing or not knowing reservation values).
2. JOHN R. VAN WINKLE, MEDIATION: A PATH BACK FOR THE LOST LAWYER 75 (2d ed.
2005).
3. See, e.g., DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES: PATHWAYS
AND PATTERNS 191 (1992) (arguing experience of mediation is universal); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH,
PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES 93 (stating mediation has
universal facets and performs similar functions in all cultures); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 20 (2d ed. 1996)
("[M]ediation has a long and varied history in almost all cultures of the world.").
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others who provide impartial assistance.4 To be productive, mediation
requires the willingness of persons disputing or seeking deals to negotiate
and talk about their concerns, perspectives, objectives, interests, and
recommended solutions. It also requires skilled process management
choices by mediators who help structure, frame, and focus these
conversations. This process works best if participants possess full authority
to negotiate and refrain from invoking authority limits to postpone, delay, or
thwart agreements.
Recent decades have seen increasing use of court-connected mediation
where litigants are encouraged or directed to negotiate using mediators
before proceeding to trial. Many states and federal judicial districts now
mandate mediation by obliging parties to use this process before scheduling
a trial date. Florida, for example, gives courts the power to order parties in
all or any part of contested civil lawsuits to mediate, with few exceptions 6.
Other states follow this approach with numerous variations.7 Federal district
courts, acting pursuant to the mandate of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1998, have developed similar court-mandated programs.8
Lawyers and clients ordered to mediate in these court systems must
typically attend the mediation unless they gain exemption. 9  Dispute
4. See, e.g., JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 2 (2d ed. 2002); ERIC GALTON,
REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION 1 (1994); MOORE, supra note 3, at 8, 41-53.
5. DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS
AND MEDIATORS 176 (1996) ("ne of the most serious obstacles to agreement occurs when a
negotiator lacks adequate authority to settle.").
6. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2)(b) (2007) (stating that courts "may refer to mediation all or any
part of a filed civil action").
7. See, e.g., ALA. CIV. CT. MEDIATION R. 2 (2003) (stating that courts may order mediation
upon their own motion); N.C. SETTLEMENT CONF. R. 1 (2006) ("Senior Resident Superior Court
Judge... shall by written order require all persons and entities ... in Rule 4 to attend a mediated
settlement conference in all civil actions" with enumerated exceptions.); S.C. JUDICIAL DEP'T R. 3(a)
(2007) ("All civil actions filed in the circuit court.., are subject to court ordered mediation ...
unless the parties agree to conduct an arbitration.").
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 652 (stating that each federal district court
shall devise and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program by local rule to encourage
and promote the use of ADR. Many federal districts have mandated mediation). See, e.g., M.D.
FLA. R. 9.03(a) (stating that the presiding judge may refer any civil action or claim to mediation);
N.D. FLA. R. 16.3(l) ("Any pending civil case may be referred to mediation by the presiding judicial
office at such time as the judicial officer determines to be in the interests of justice."); S.D. FLA. R.
16.2(D)(1) (stating that in every civil case, with specified exceptions, the court shall order
mediation); E.D., W.D., & M.D. LA. LOc. R. 16.3.1M, R, C (stating that a court may refer a case to
mediation or early neutral evaluation at its discretion); W.D. WASH. R. 39.1 (stating that courts may
designate any case for mediation under this rule).
9. Florida, for example, requires appearance at a mediation by "the party or its representative
having full authority to settle without further consultation" and "the party's counsel of record, if
any," unless changed by court order or stipulated by parties. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.720(b)(l)-(2).
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resolution system designers require mediation to encourage parties to
explore ways to resolve or narrow their controversies.' 0  Mandating
mediation before trial encourages lawyers and clients to think seriously
about their objectives, risks, and collateral litigation consequences including
expense, delay, and stress." Mediation provides mechanisms for broader
information sharing than rules of procedure and evidence define as relevant
for litigation. 12  It creates opportunities to generate a larger range of
solutions than courts can provide through legal and equitable remedies. ' 3 It
generates a forum allowing empathy, apology, and other forms of human
connection and re-connection, paths which litigation remedies typically
ignore. 14 Mandating mediation also satisfies systemic interests in avoiding
unnecessary trials and focuses limited, expensive judicial resources on
claims and issues that parties cannot resolve by negotiating with the help of
mediators. 15
To further these goals, courts typically seek to ensure that their
mandating orders are respected, and that resulting mediations have
maximum opportunities to succeed. These implementation efforts typically
include requirements to attend, to bring sufficient negotiation authority, and,
occasionally, to negotiate in good faith. These efforts may conflict
occasionally with interests of participants and their lawyers not to
10. John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation
In Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 74, 123-24 (2002).
11. Lawrence M. Watson, Initiating the Settlement Process-Ethical Considerations, in
Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive Guide, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 7, 15-16 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002).
12. Confidential communication made possible by caucusing increases chances that mediators
can gather information about interests and priorities, topics that typically do not connect directly to
the remedial elements involved in adjudication. Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What do We Need
Mediation For?": Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1
(1996). Non-monetized interests and needs lie underneath the divergent positions, justifications, and
supporting and attacking argumentation that comprise the focus of litigation and are regulated by
rules of evidence and procedure. See Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney
Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 134 (2007).
13. Professor Robert Mnookin and colleagues argue that all negotiations, while inevitably
involving distributive issues regarding who gets how much, also present opportunities to create joint
value and find joint gain. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 4 (2000).
14. Wayne D. Brazil, An Assessment: Court-Related ADR 25 Years After Pound, 9 P. RESOL.
AG. 4, 5 (Winter 2003).
15. Lande, supra note 10, at 124; see also Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a
Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 256, 25&-62 (1986).
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negotiate. 16  These interests can stem from desires to establish favorable
legal precedent, send signals of resolve to other potential adversaries, secure
the procedural protections and public visibility that trials afford, and pursue
other context-specific objectives. '7
The interests of courts and the public also may conflict with apparent
needs; some clients and lawyers have to behave badly in mediations. 8
Although little empirical data exists,' 9 legal scholars express concern that
mediation participants occasionally behave in ways that do not enhance the
opportunities mediation provides to foster resolutions. 20 These concerns
include failures to attend, to bring sufficient settlement authority, or to make
any, or suitable, offers. 21  Expression of these concerns, and arguments
about how to handle them, typically occurs within a broader debate about
whether participants have a duty to act in good faith in mandated mediations.
Proponents on both sides of this question, often expressing concerns about a
cottage industry of good faith satellite litigation,22 have generated a cottage
industry of articles debating the appropriateness of establishing, the
16. ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for
Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation Programs,
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/draftres2.doc [hereinafter Good Faith Resolution] (last visited Oct.
22, 2007).
17. Id.
18. See Lande, supra note 10, at 122-23.
19. One exception is a survey of lawyers participating in mediations in the Early Assessment
Program of the United States District Court of Missouri. See DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A
STUDY OF FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT OF 1990 242-44 (1997), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/0024.pdf (last visited Apr.
2007). This study showed that 18% of lawyers encountered parties not participating in good faith,
and 63% shared that they had not experienced bad faith behavior by participants. Id.; see also
Lande, supra note 10, at 141 n.5.
20. Many have expressed concern that lawyers will transfer adversarial negotiating tactics
seeking to gain partisan advantage in mediations in ways that undermine the process' potential to
develop different kinds of outcomes than litigation's win-lose results. See, e.g., Lande, supra note
10, at 122-23; Kimberlee K. Kovach, Ethics for Whom: The Recognition of Diversity in Lawyering
Calls for Plurality in Ethical Considerations and Rules of Representational Work, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note II, at 57, 62-63; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics in Negotiation, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility in Negotiation, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 11, at 119, 148 n.89.
21. Lande, supra note 10, at 82-83.
22. Scholars express concern that rules requiring good faith negotiating at mediations will
create distracting collateral litigation about their breach. See Lande, supra note 10, at 98-101. An
analogy is often drawn to the experience with the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure II which created "an avalanche of 'satellite litigation."' Id. at 99 (quoting Georgene
Vairo, Rule II and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 598 (1998)).
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difficulties of enforcing, and the congruence of good faith based standards
with core mediation principles.2 3
At the risk of building another cottage, this article examines only one
aspect of this debate-minimizing limited authority negotiating in
mandatory mediations. After describing current problems and existing
approaches reflected in regulatory and decisional standards, this article
proposes a contextualized approach that avoids this good faith debate. It
disagrees with views that invocations of authority limits necessarily fall
outside the scope of objectively determinable behavior, the standard
currently offered as the permissible basis for judicial regulation through
sanctions for non-compliance.2 4 It also argues that relying on this current
standard may encourage limited authority negotiating.
This article contends that requiring mediation participants to refrain
from claiming limited negotiating authority and to just say no when they
lack authorization, particularly regarding dollar issues, is more likely to
encourage full preparation to negotiate the economic aspects of disputes that
litigation invariably generates. It suggests that encouraging attorneys to
comprehensively prepare the dollar dimensions of claims and defenses may
help them anticipate and gather sufficient authority to handle potential
decisions if conversations move to agreement options beyond economics. It
concludes by defending its proposals against concerns that they will
undercut important mediation policies regarding confidentiality and
mediator impartiality.
23. Many articles advocate general good faith obligations. See, e.g., Alan Kirtley, The
Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege
Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 1 (1995); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575 (1997); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant
Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good Faith Participation,
Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591 (2001). Many articles criticize general good faith
standards. ee, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation About the Current Status and
Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 11, 30-33 (2000); Edward F.
Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should Be
Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2089-94 (1993); Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary
Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L., 69, 86-97 (2001).
24. Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 2-3.
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II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
Limited authority problems arise in mandatory mediations only when
negotiators act as representatives of ultimate decisionmakers, as lawyers
invariably do.25 Persons possessing decision making power cannot credibly
invoke limited authority. This is one reason why statutes and rules creating
mandatory mediations require clients or fully authorized representatives to
attend them.
Human parties who attend mandatory mediations have opportunities to
express their concerns and interests, to hear the perspectives of other
participants, and to track evolving conversations regarding settlement
options and potential terms. They can see and hear how others feel about
issues and potential solutions. They can gain insights into how persuasive
these perceptions and positions might be to litigation decisionmakers.
Human clients also presumably carry full decision making authority
since the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility allocate decisions
about objectives of representation to the clients and not to their lawyers.26
Lawyers representing clients are bound by ethical rules to defer to client
decisions regarding settlement of lawsuits. 27  Limited authority claims
cannot be credibly made by attorneys when their human clients attend
because lawyers or mediators can immediately explore authorization issues
directly with these ultimate decisionmakers.28
Problems with limited authority claims in mandatory mediations arise in
two litigation contexts when ultimate decisionmakers do not attend. The
most common problem concerns non-human agency, entity, institutional, or
organizational litigants where decision-making authority is held by
individuals or groups whose physical attendance and participation may be
difficult to arrange.29 Senior company officials, directors, and agency heads
are often geographically distant from places where their agencies, companies
or institutions sue or are sued and ordered to mediate. 30 Representatives not
possessing the same unfettered decision making powers that human clients
25. When negotiating during mediations, lawyers act as agents of their clients. Relationships
between principals and agents have been identified as one of three important, inherent tensions that
must be managed effectively in the negotiation process. MNOOKtN ET AL., supra note 13, at 4, 69-
91.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983).
27. Id.
28. Peters, supra note 12, at 132-33.
29. See HAROLD 1. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-
SOLVING PROCESS 188 (2004).
30. See COOLEY, supra note 4, at 72.
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hold typically come to these mediations, and they may bring varying levels
of authority on both dollar and non-monetary issues.
The second category concerns situations where lawyers are permitted to
participate without their clients' attendance. This usually occurs in courts
possessing jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that do not carry large dollar
consequences. Mandatory mediations occur in these courts even though
they may use less formal litigation procedures. One procedural relaxation
that occurs in these systems concerns who must attend mandatory
mediations. For example, in Florida's small claims division of its county
courts, involving lawsuits that do not seek more than $5,000, lawyers are
permitted to attend mandatory mediations without their clients. 3' The non-
appearing clients in these mediations are frequently companies suing to
collect allegedly unpaid contractual obligations. Other states follow similar
procedures for low dollar claims.32 The limited amounts in controversy,
high volume of cases processed, and frequent appearances by lawyers
covering for out-of-town colleagues generate frequent limited authority
claims in this context.33
31. Florida Rule of Small Claims Procedure 7.090(a) permits parties to appear personally or
by counsel at pretrial conferences where mediations are ordered if defendants deny the claim in
whole or in part. FLA. SM. CL. R. 7.090(a). Eighth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida Administrative
Order No. 3.1 100(D)(14)(I) and (2), regulating county mediation in Alachua County, Florida,
requires appearances at mediations by parties or their representatives or their attorney of record.
Admin. Order No. 3.1100(D)(14)(1), (2), 8th Jud. Cir. Fla., available at http://www.circuit8.org/ao/
(follow "Section 3. Civil"; then follow "3.1100(D) County Mediation in Alachua County"
hyperlink).
32. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 631.14(3) (2007) (allowing any person to be represented by an
attorney in a small claims action); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.01(D) (West 2008) (permitting but
not requiring appearance by an attorney); ME. R. SMALL CLAIMS P. 16(a) (allowing parties to be
represented by attorneys in small claims actions).
33. These cases typically involve collection actions filed against unrepresented defendants by
out-of-town lawyers representing out-of-town claimants. Don Peters, Oiling Rusty Wheels: A Small
Claims Mediation Narrative, 50 FLA. L. REV. 761, 772 n.24 (1998). Often at the last minute, locally
hired lawyers attend pretrial conferences and take default judgments if defendants do not appear. Id.
If defendants appear and deny claims, these covering lawyers represent plaintiffs at the mediations
which occur immediately thereafter. Id. Although these covering attorneys are supposed to be fully
authorized to negotiate under applicable rules, they seldom are, in my experience. Don Peters
(unpublished notes, on file with author).
In the fall term of 2005, five of the first seven small claims matters I mediated or
supervised in the Virgil Hawkins County Mediation Clinic at the Levin College of Law involved
covering lawyers handling collection claims for out-of-town lawyers. Id. None of these lawyers had
full authority. All invoked limited authority early in their mediations. All of these mediations
resulted in quick impasses that led to trial settings. Id.
279
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To anticipate and resolve limited authority issues, legislatures and courts
typically enact statutes or rules requiring attendance by "fully authorized"
representatives. Florida, for example, requires attendance by parties or their
representatives "having full authority to settle without further consultation"
at mandated mediations.34 When lawyers appear in mandatory small claims
mediations without clients or entity representatives present, they are required
to have "full authority to settle without further consultation."35 Other states
and federal districts have adopted similar language.3 6 Federal judges, using
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 to convene pretrial conferences
encompassing settlement discussions, often employ similar language.37
The emerging consensus on what full authority means in mandatory
mediation contexts adopts a commonly held perspective that negotiation
Instead of saying no, covering attorneys often invoke limited authority and press non-
represented defendants to pay claims regardless of defenses asserted. Id. They also take notes on
potential defenses debtors mention and send that information along to the attorneys for whom they
are covering. Id. Often displaying no preparation other than reviewing the pleadings in court files,
these covering attorneys frequently cannot answer basic questions about claims or plaintiffs. Id.
Given the small dollar amounts and large numbers of cases involved, referring lawyers seldom are
available for consultation during these mediations. Id. Most mediators conclude that these
dynamics make meaningful mediation impossible and quickly declare impasse. Id. This action
often frustrates defendants who need information or want to discuss reasoned reductions of claims.
Id.
34. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b)(1). This includes circuit court claims in excess of $15,000, family
matters, and county court litigation involving between $5,000 and $15,000, and small claims of less
than $5,000. See id.
35. FLA. SM. CL. R. 7 .09 0(a).
36. See, e.g., Culbertson-Froid-Bainville Health Care Corp. v. JP Stevens & Co., 122 P.3d 431
(Mont. 2005) (requiring court ordered attendance by an officer, director or employee having full
authority to settle the claim for a corporate party, or in the case of a governmental agency, a
representative of that agency with full authority to negotiate on behalf of the agency and recommend
a settlement to the appropriate decision making body of the agency); In re Court-Annexed ADR
Rules & Amendment to Rule 601, SCACR, 2006 S.C. Lexis 159, *11-12 (S.C. 2006) (requiring
attendance by officer, director, or employee having full authority to settle for corporate party, or
agency representative with full authority to negotiate and recommend a settlement to appropriate
agency decision-making body); M.D. FLA. L.R. 9.05(c) (requiring attendance by all parties,
corporate representatives and any other claims professionals with "full authority to negotiate a
settlement"); S.D. FLA. L.R. 16.2(E) ("[A]ll parties, a corporate representative, and any other
required claims professionals.., shall be present at the mediation conference with full authority to
negotiate .... )
37. See, e.g., Turner v. Young, 205 F.R.D. 592, 595 (D. Kan. 2002) (attendance by party
representative is mandatory under D. KAN R. 16.3); Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Von Paris & Sons,
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 808, 810 (D. Md. 2001) ("Mediation is fair and effective only if persons with
settlement authority are present at the conference to listen to what the others and the mediator have
to say."); Francis v. Women's Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646, 648-49
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that court-ordered conference required defense counsel to see that
"representatives of insurance carriers with authority to settle are present or at a minimum available
by telephone, if not present" (internal quotations omitted)).
8
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involves only distributing the value associated with issues presented by
disputants. 38 These issues invariably involve dollar dimensions because
litigation largely travels on asserted legal remedies that award monetary
damages. Most legal remedies define issues as, and conflate interests into,
monetary claims. Consequently, full authority is usually defined as the
ability to pay up to the full amount of the claim and accept any amount less
than the claim. 9 Essentially, this means that representatives must be able to
pay what it takes to a settle a monetary claim or say no and pursue other
alternatives.
Minimizing limited authority negotiating in mandatory mediations
occurs in a context where most courts believe that authorized participants are
not obligated to negotiate when they attend.4 °  Although mandated
mediations contemplate attendance by human litigants or fully authorized
representatives, they do not require that attendees negotiate once there.
Litigants have a right, guaranteed by state constitutional provisions and the
7 th Amendment of the United States Constitution, to bring claims and
defenses supported by sufficient evidence to trial if they wish to do so.
41
38. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b)(3) (representatives of insurance carriers must have "full
authority to settle up to the amount of the plaintiffs last demand or policy limits, whichever is
less... "); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that "authority to settle" means corporate representatives holding entity positions which
allow them to speak definitively and to commit organizations); Admin. Order No. 3.1 100(D)(14)(1),
(2), 8th Jud. Cir. Fla., available at http://www.circuit8.org/ao/ (follow "Section 3. Civil"; then
follow "3.1100(D) County Mediation in Alachua County" hyperlink) (defining full authority to
mean the authority to settle without further consultation).
40. See, e.g., Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating there is no
requirement that parties make any offers at mediations); Francis, 144 F.R.D. at 647 (finding that
courts can require attendance but not coerce parties to settle); Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d
Cir. 1985) (holding that the lower court abused its discretion by ordering defendant to pay sanctions
for failing to settle before trial); Salfen v. United States, No. 3:00-CV-0463-G, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17623 (N.D. Tex., Oct. 18, 2000) (stating that referral to mediation is not an order to settle
case).
41. This view reflects strongly held cultural and legal commitments to individual initiative and
autonomy in resolving disputes. AUGSBURGER, supra note 3, at 8. General American cultural
traditions let individuals define what constitutes disputes, and choose whether and how to resolve
them. Id. America's culture is undeniably individualistic in orientation and this perspective holds
that conflicts are owned and should be resolved by privately asserting and negotiating rights and
pursuing adjudicative remedies. Id. Individual perspectives promote ideas of the self as
"independent, self-directed, and autonomous." MICHELLE LEBARON, BRIDGING CULTURAL
CONFLICTS 60 (2003). American negotiation theory contains individualistic assumptions that
bargainers are able to make proposals and concessions and maximize gains" in their self-interest. Id.
at 61. American individuals and businesses are free to perceive situations as non-disputes. See
9
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Litigation encompasses values other than creating pre-suit agreements
that weigh risks and costs of adjudication against the benefits of what
litigants will offer to avoid them, and what can be created to provide non-
monetary, and often mutual, gain.42 Accordingly, litigants may legitimately
choose to not negotiate to pursue objectives including establishing favorable
precedent, protecting themselves from future claims, and securing the
procedural safeguards and public notoriety that litigation may bring.43
Negotiation, whether done inside or outside mediation, comprises a dispute
resolving process that is consensual, 44 and its consensual nature includes
choosing not to engage in it.
Legislatures and courts, on the other hand, have the power to encourage
litigants to consider seriously the advantages of negotiating and to engage in
it if they wish.45 Courts have invoked this power to reject constitutional and
other challenges to statutes and rules requiring attendance by human parties
and authorized entity representatives at court-ordered mediations.46
Pursuant to this right, courts consistently hold that parties can be sanctioned
for failing to attend mandatory mediations.4 7 This facet of mandatory
mediation is one in which courts across the country consistently agree. 48 As
demonstrated by data suggesting that between 50 to 65% of court-ordered
mediations produce settlements,49 getting the decisionmakers to mediations
after substantial discovery often produces desired results.
David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Krtitzer, & Joel B. Grossman, The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72, 86 (1983) (estimating that lawsuits are filed in
11.2% of disputes involving more than $1,000). They are also free to pursue any of the three
peaceful dispute resolution options of avoidance, consensual negotiation or mediation, and
adjudication via litigation or arbitration. E.g., MOORE, supra note 3, at 6-12; KARL A. SLAIKEU,
WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MEDIATING DISPUTES 4-5 (1996).
42. E.g., Stoehr v.Yost, 765 N.E.2d 684, 687-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that mediation is
not all about money and is aimed at more than just accomplishing settlements).
43. See Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
44. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 6-8; SLAIKEU, supra note 41, at 3-4.
45. Courts have inherent power to require attendance at mandatory mediation. See, e.g., G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989); Lande, supra note
10, at 134.
46. E.g., Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
47. See, e.g., Seidel v. Bradberry, No. 3:94-CV-0147-G, 1998 WL 386161, at 3 (N.D. Tex.
July 7, 1998); Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. App. 1992).
48. See Lande, supra note 10, at 84.
49. See, e.g., Charles E. Clawson, The Use of Mediation in the 20thtrict, THE ARKANSAS
LAWYER, available at http://www.arkbar.com/ArkLawyer_-Mag/Articles/Mediation20thDistrict
Spring05.html (estimating that 70% of cases referred to mediation statewide produced full or partial
agreements); Florida Dispute Resolution Center, Florida Mediation & Arbitration Programs: A
Compendium 55, 102 (2006) (reporting partial data showing 70% settlement rate in county
mediations and 55% in circuit court mediations); Statistics in Mediation, http://adrr.com/
10
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Getting sufficiently authorized decisionmakers to mandatory mediations
to minimize limited authority negotiating, this article's focus, has proven
more difficult. Limited data and several appellate opinions suggest that
lawyers and litigants encounter challenges complying with rules requiring
fully authorized representative attendance. An informal survey of 30
experienced civil trial mediators showed that limited authority was the most
frequently encountered problem at their mediations.50 An analysis of 1,223
reported court opinions involving mediation issues between January 1, 1999,
and December 31, 2003, found significant litigation regarding alleged
failures to bring authorized representatives that reached varying
conclusions.5' More than half of the appellate courts which have reviewed
disputes regarding alleged failures to send authorized representatives to
mediation have found and sanctioned violations of their rules.52 Other
decisions, however, have not enforced full authorization requirements. 
53
III. THE MISTAKEN, FAITH-BASED PATH FOR ANALYZING
AUTHORITY ISSUES
A major analytic challenge concerns whether requiring fully authorized
attendance should be part of a good or bad faith inquiry into mediation
participation. 54  This challenge sits within the larger question of whether
adr4/statistics.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) (stating a 70% settlement rate in court-ordered
mediation in North Carolina).
50. Lawrence M. Watson, Presentation at the American College of Civil Trial Mediators
Annual Meeting: Legislating Good Faith Standards for Civil Trial Mediations (July 16, 2007)
(unpublished notes on file with author).
51. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, II HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 43, 59, 62 (2006) (listing cases involving
mediator testimony about attendance and authority and more than thirty opinions involving party
presented evidence regarding attendance and authority issues).
52. See Lande, supra note 10, at 84. Decisions finding rule violations include Nick v. Morgan
Foods, Inc., 270 F.3d 590, 596-97 (8th Cir. 2001); Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.4:CV97-3015,
1998 WL 272879, 1, 4-8 (D. Neb. May 6, 1998); Francis v. Women's Obstetrics & Gynecology
Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646, 647 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Semiconductors, Inc. v. Golasa, 525 So. 2d
519, 519-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Hill v. Imperial Savings, 852 F. Supp. 1354 (W.D. Tex. 1992); Stoehr v.Yost,
765 N.E.2d 684, 687-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 451-54
(Tex. App. 2000).
54. Most analysis adopts this frame. See Lande, supra note 10, at 82; Good Faith Resolution,
supra note 16. Twenty-two states have statutory requirements for good faith mediating, seventeen
have included these provisions into their procedural rules, and this obligation appears in numerous
court orders mandating mediation. Watson, supra note 50.
11
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system designers should regulate how litigants must negotiate at mandatory
mediations. 5
Advocates of a broad, general duty to negotiate in good faith propose
that litigants must engage in substantive bargaining, make reasonable
settlement offers, and use consistent legal arguments.56 These proposals
reflect concern that insincere negotiating behaviors by some lawyers and
litigants unfairly burden participants who act differently at mandatory
mediations. 7  Advocates of broad good faith also emphasize that these
behaviors undercut mediation's potential to develop value-creating outcomes
instead of the win-lose, all or nothing distributions that litigation produces. 8
Anecdotal evidence suggests that actual mediation behavior often
justifies these concerns. A study of Ottawa lawyers concluded that some
lawyers intentionally use mandatory mediation to mislead, discover
information, gain negotiation leverage, stall, increase opponent's costs, and
wear down participants.5 9 A lawyer in this study shared that if he didn't
want to settle, "mandatory mediation is custom made" because he knows
how to make it look like he is heading in the direction of settlement with no
intention of resolving, and how to "talk the talk" but not "walk the walk.,
60
Critics of good faith standards argue that they infringe litigants' and
lawyers' discretion to decide how they want to negotiate. 61 They contend
that requiring good faith negotiating creates inherently ambiguous standards
that do not provide clear understandings of what behaviors are required,
prohibited, and subject to sanctions.62 They also express concerns that
ambiguities and uncertainties will cause litigants to refrain from legitimate
negotiation behaviors, generate satellite litigation enforcing and defending
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 23, at 604; Lande, supra note 10, at 77; Ulrich Boettger,
Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment-Against a Good-Faith Requirement in Mandatory
Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG 1, 14 (2004).
57. See, e.g., Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns, and
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DiSP. RESOL. 367,
373-74 (2002); Kovach, supra note 23, at 595; John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil
Cases in State Courts: A Litigant's Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 813, 848-49 (1999).
58. See, e.g., Boettger, supra note 56, at 45; Kovach, supra note 23, at 62-63; Peters, supra
note 12, at 138.
59. Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected
Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 256-57 (2002).
60. Macfarlane, supra note 59, at 267.
61. Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 1-2.
62. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 10, at 86-94; Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 5-6.
"One New York court defined 'good faith' as an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition." Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 6.
284
12
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol8/iss2/3
[Vol. 8: 2, 2008]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
sanctions, and stimulate inappropriate conduct by participants and
mediators.63
The 2004 Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and
Mediation Advocates in Court-Mandated Mediation Programs adopted by
the Dispute Resolution Section of the American Bar Association synthesized
existing regulations and scholarly commentary and recommended best
practices for mandatory mediation. 64 This Resolution recommended that
courts impose sanctions only for violations of rules specifying objectively
determinable conduct. 65 As examples of objectively determinable conduct,
this Resolution listed failures to attend court-mandated mediations 66 and
provide written pre-mediation memoranda. 67 This Resolution reasoned that
actions manifesting these failures can be demonstrated without analyzing
subjective negotiation tactics. As examples of subjective tactic analysis, this
Resolution listed suitability of offers, substantiality of participation,
consistency of arguments, and honesty of statements.6 8
Without clearly indicating why, this Resolution included failing to bring
representatives with sufficient settlement authority to mandatory mediations
as subjective behavior that courts should not enforce by sanctions. The
Resolution did not clearly indicate whether it viewed these failures as
appropriate subjects for regulation absent a faith-based analysis. This
analysis apparently focused on ensuring adequate authority, which equates
the standard with the actual value of claims.6 This frame injects subjective
determinations comparing authority brought to mediations with actual case
values and outcomes. 70 Other critics of a broad faith-based standard have
similarly concluded that enforcement difficulties make failing to bring
sufficiently authorized representative to mandatory mediations not an
appropriate matter for faith-based regulation.7 1
This article agrees that adding faith-based arguments about whether
complying with a requirement that fully authorized representatives attend
63. E.g., Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 5-8.
64. Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 5-8.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
67. Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 2.
68. Id.
69. Watson, supra note 50.
70. Id.
71. E.g., Lande, supra note 10, at 133 (arguing such a regulation is problematic because it
invites "resistance and easy evasion.").
285
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injects unnecessarily subjective ambiguities. To the extent that the
Resolution's analysis concludes that provisions and orders requiring fully
authorized representatives to attend should not be created or enforced,
however, it goes too far. This view ignores a contextualized approach that
promotes compliance with court orders, discourages abusive uses of limited
authority tactics, and protects sincere participants.
IV. TOWARD A CONTEXTUALIZED APPROACH TO MINIMIZING
LIMITED AUTHORITY BARGAINING IN MANDATORY
MEDIATIONS
This article argues that minimizing limited authority bargaining requires
precise, contextualized analysis, not a simple good or bad faith labeling
approach. The analysis recommended here acknowledges the complexities
and challenges caused by limited authority negotiation tactics and genuine
authorization dilemmas in both dollar aspects and defenses and non-
monetary resolution options.7 It proposes contextualized and different
treatment of these complexities and challenges.
Although authority limits distort, delay, and thwart both types of
discussions, they probably create more harm on dollar issues for several
reasons. Limited authority bargaining occurs more frequently regarding
dollar issues because mandatory mediation negotiations usually require
evaluating lawsuit claims and defenses. These conversations tend to occur
earlier rather than later in mandatory mediations because lawsuits frame
these issues, and participants usually define their interests initially as
maximizing gain regarding these subjects. 73 This framing and perceiving is
often described as value-claiming or adversarial negotiation.7" Research
suggests that a majority of American lawyers prefer these frames, use these
perceptions, and negotiate seeking exclusively or primarily to claim value.75
72. These include access to equipment, apologies, barter arrangements, bid invitations, future
discounts or work opportunities, joint ventures, and structured annuities. Watson, supra note 11, at
16.
73. See Peters, supra note 12, at 138.
74. This way to frame negotiation theoretically captures the inescapable tension that exists in
virtually all negotiations between competing to gain individual advantage and cooperating to create
joint gain. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 30-35 (1986); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 4, 11-
43.
75. ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING SKILLS 374 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 764-65 (1984); Don Peters,
Mapping, Modeling, and Critiquing: Facilitating Learning Negotiation, Mediation, Interviewing,
and Counseling, 48 FLA. L. REV. 875, 914 (1996).
286
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A survey of 2,000 Denver and Phoenix lawyers showed pervasive use of
value-claiming negotiating. 76 Another study revealed that about 70% of the
cases in which 515 lawyers and 55 judges in New Jersey participated were
settled using predominately value-claiming actions.77 Undoubtedly, many
78 thilitigants share this orientation, and their lawyers probably suggest it to
them when they don't.
79
Full authority inquiries should be framed in the same effective way that
mediations unfold. The emphasis in each context should not be on how
lawyers value cases, a subjective process upon which ultimate agreement is
unlikely, but rather on willingness to pay or accept whatever it will take to
resolve claims. Lawsuit mediations evaluate claims and defenses in the
context of offers and concessions. This reality generates proposals
representing the most or least negotiators will pay to avoid impasse and
ultimately trial. As such, lawsuit mediations should make the task of
ensuring attendance by fully authorized representatives less difficult.
Because this form of negotiation unfolds on linear frames, it can be planned
in advance. 80 This planning can be done as part of pre-mediation counseling
between lawyers and representatives of their agency, entity, organizational,
or institutional clients.8' Pretrial discovery often provides detailed
information that informs these conversations. When analyzing best
alternatives to mediated agreements, which invariably involve trial outcome
predictions, representatives and their lawyers can develop dollar minimums
and maximums beyond which they would rather go to trial than settle.
Conversations providing opportunities to invoke limited authority
tactically regarding non-monetary issues, on the other hand, typically occur
later in mediations, if at all. 82 These conversations encourage value-creating
or problem-solving negotiating which enlarges bargaining agendas, explores
high value-low cost trades, and seeks to satisfy everyone's core needs
76. Completed by Professor Gerald Williams, this study showed that 67% of these lawyers
reported that they primarily used adversarial, competitive, gain-maximizing behaviors when they
negotiated. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT 15-40 (1983).
77. Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement
Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want", 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
253, 255 (1997).
78. See MNOOKINETAL., supra note 13, at 168-71.
79. Id.
80. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 75, at 375-76, 474-77.
81. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 29, at 16-25; COOLEY, supra note 4, at 69-70; GALTON,
supra note 4, at 81-83.
82. See generally VAN WINKLE, supra note 2, at 37.
15
Peters: Just Say No: Minimizing Limited Authority Negotiating in Court-Ma
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2008
maximally. 83  Value-creating options are often generated by questions
mediators ask which explore litigants' non-monetized interests. This usually
requires analysis that moves beyond the conflicting and divergent positions,
justifications, and arguments that accompany value-claiming negotiation. 84
Often these conversations are not welcome until litigants first confront an
apparent impasse in efforts to maximize gain based entirely on monetary
offers and concessions. 85
Predicting the direction these conversations may take is more difficult
than anticipating linear value-claiming positions, justifications, moves, and
final proposals. Although general possibilities exist that should be
anticipated when planning ways to influence other negotiators to say yes, 86
pleadings and pretrial discovery seldom provide significant information
about these topics. This may make it more difficult to find fully authorized
entity or institutional representatives. It also suggests that invoking
authoritative limits on these issues is more likely to result from genuine
preparation difficulties than from tactical efforts to increase gain at the
expense of others.
These differences should be considered when developing an approach to
minimize limited authority negotiating. Below I propose a contextualized
standard aimed at minimizing limited authority negotiating in mandatory
mediations. It could be included in enabling legislation, implementing rules,
and judicial orders mandating mediation:
Parties and their lawyers shall attend mandatory mediations unless their
absence is excused by the court. Where parties are agencies, entities,
institutions, or organizations, a representative fully authorized to settle all
claims shall attend. Full authorization for monetary aspects of mandatory
mediations includes the ability to pay up to the amount demanded and accept
any lesser figure. Full authorization for non-monetary aspects of mandatory
mediations includes attendance by persons with sufficient knowledge of the
83. Professors Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello define creating value as building negotiation
outcomes that, "[W]hen compared to other possible negotiated outcomes, either makes both parties
better off or makes one party better off without making the other party worse off." MNOOKtN ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 12. These scholars also argue that all negotiations, while inevitably involving
distributive issues regarding who gets how much, also present opportunities to create joint value and
find joint gain. Id. at 4.
84. See Peters, supra note 12, at 136-37.
85. See VAN WINKLE, supra note 2, at 37 (arguing that parties get stuck at least twice in most
mediations, and the first occurs when they realize that they cannot reach an agreement bargaining
linearly about dollar issues framed within fact and law issues raised by lawsuit claims and defenses).
86. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 29, at 30-39; ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE
PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-50 (2d ed. 1991);
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 28-32; WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR
WAY FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 64 (1991).
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needs, interests, and operations of the agency, entity, institution, or
organization, the discretion to negotiate, and the ability to make either
commitments without further consultation or influential recommendations
that are likely to be accepted. Representatives planning to attend who do not
possess full authority as defined above shall advise the other parties, the
court, and the mediator of their limits no later than fourteen days before the
date the ordered mediation is scheduled. Nothing in this provision requires
the parties and their lawyers to negotiate when they attend or reach
agreements when they negotiate.
This proposed standard provides a better approach to requiring fully
authorized participants because it addresses both monetary and non-
monetary aspects of mandatory mediations. Defending this claim requires
analyzing the difficulties minimizing limited authority bargaining in both
value-claiming and value-creating negotiation contexts. As argued earlier,
value-claiming usually presents an easier context for minimizing limited
authority negotiating problems.
A. MEDIATING DOLLAR CLAIMS
Accepting the usefulness of a norm that limits regulatory and
enforcement standards to objectively determinable behavior does not require
eliminating current approaches to that define full authority regarding dollar
issues in mandatory mediations. These definitions travel on objective, not
subjective actions. They are not violated until lawyers or client
representatives claim limited, monetary negotiating authority.
Lawyers and representatives either have or do not have authority to pay
up to the full amount of claims. As the proposed standard clarifies, they do
not have to negotiate at all.87 They do not have to reach agreement if they
do negotiate. 88 If bargaining reaches a point that exceeds their authorized
limits, they can simply refuse to negotiate further. They can base refusals on
different evaluations of claim elements and damage components. They can
base them on different interpretations of disputed facts or applicable legal
principles. They can just say no.
Litigants who decide to send representatives with limited monetary
authority should know and accept the consequences of their potential
inability to complete negotiations at mandatory mediations. A choice to
87. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
289
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send limited authority representatives often flows from decisions made
within hierarchies about claim valuations or negotiating strategies. 89 While
courts and legislatures should not seek to compel organizational and
institutional litigants to change their decision making structures to
accommodate mandatory mediations, 9° no policies prevent them from
insisting that negotiators refrain from using monetary authority limits as
negotiating tactics. The proposed standard above makes this distinction
clear.
Once planned authorization limits are reached, lawyers, representatives
and mediators retain options to explore revising and increasing monetary
authorizations by phone, e-mail, or instant messaging. 91 If that does not
work, mediators can adjourn to permit prompt revisions, or terminate the
proceedings, thus expecting lawyers and representatives to either continue
negotiating, or take disputes to trial. All of these options can be pursued
based on interpretative and evaluative differences without invoking limited
authority negotiating.
One challenge with invocations of limited authority is assessing whether
or not they are true. Mediators report that lawyers lie frequently during
mediations. 92 Some lawyers brag about resolving cases at mandatory
mediations by misrepresentation.
93
Creating and enforcing obligations to possess full settlement
authorization may deter lawyers from invoking false authority limits.
Uncertainly exists regarding whether lawyers must speak honestly when
making statements about their authority. 94  Some lawyers contend that
settlement authority lies are permissible negotiation tactics and that lying
89. Carter, supra note 57, at 401.
90. Carter, supra note 57, at 401-02.
91. GOLANN, supra note 5, at 178.
92. E.g., Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties with their Statements During
Negotiation: Dymysticizing the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the
Mediation Privilege Statutes, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1037, 1091 n.210 (2000) (noting a professor has
taken such reports). One survey revealed that on average, occurred in twenty-five percent of the
matters in which the observed participated. Peters, supra note 12, at 124. The average estimates
regarding lies that concern material facts in caucuses showed that they occurred in seventeen percent
of the mediations in which respondents participated. Id.
93. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 142 (1994).
94. See Peters, supra note 12, at 132-33. One scholar asked fifteen legal ethics scholars,
lawyers, and judges about the appropriateness of a lie that a negotiator does not have authority to
settle at a particular figure when they have received express authority to do so. Larry Lempert, In
Settlement Talks, Does Telling the Truth Have Its Limits?, 2 INSIDE LITIG. 1 (1988). Seven said yes,
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about negotiation authority is commonly done.95  Many contend that
statements regarding claim settlement intentions are ethically permissible
lies that fall within the safe harbor of Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 96  A
recent survey of twenty-three lawyers, five of whom were practicing
mediators, showed an average of their estimates, suggesting that bargaining
authority lies occurred in thirty-five percent of the negotiations in which
they participated. 97
ABA Formal Opinion 93-370 opined that lawyers may not lie or engage
in misrepresentations in response to a judge's questions concerning the
limits of their settlement authority in civil matters. 98  Despite
recommendations, the ABA did not include mediation in its definition of
tribunal as part of the Ethics 2000 Commission's revision of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 99 Consequently, lawyers in mediations are
not bound by the more stringent standard applied to tribunals that requires
95. E.g., JETHRO LIBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT
To DO ABOUT IT 31-32 (quoting a leading lawyer approving lying about negotiation authority);
MICHAEL MELTSNER AND PHILIP SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 232, 237 (1974) (describing authority lies that are commonly used by
lawyers while not personally endorsing them). See Larry Lempert, supra note 94, at 1.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1, cmt. 2 (2002). This Comment establishes that
whether statements should be regarded as material facts prohibited by Model Rule 4.1 (a) depends on
circumstances. Id. It suggests that "under generally accepted negotiation conventions certain types
of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact." Id. This Comment then lists
three examples of statements generally not deemed material facts by negotiation conventions,
including "estimates of price or value placed on" transaction subjects and "intentions as to
acceptable settlement of claims." Id. The Model Rules provide no substantiation or examples of its
empirical claim about generally accepted negotiation conventions causing scholars to question who
accepts these conventions. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20, at 132. Research showing large and
consistent differences among lawyers, judges, and academics regarding the ethical appropriateness
of common negotiation statements including authority lies also undermine regulatory reliance on the
actual existence of such conventions. See Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in
Negotiations, 8 REV. LITIG. 173, 176-68 (1989); Lempert, supra note 94, at 1.
97. Peters, supra note 12, at 121, 130. Law students may inadvertently learn to do this in
simulation-based negotiation classes where the phrase "I'm not authorized" means there is nothing
in my short set of confidential facts that relates to this.
98. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993-98)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 93-370].
99. Focusing on the non-adjudicative nature of mediation rather than its frequent direct
connection to judicial proceedings when mandated by courts, the Model Rules define tribunal as "a
court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or legislative body, administrative agency or
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honesty and forbids false statements regarding all facts, regardless of
materiality.' 00
The uncertainties regarding how honestly lawyers need communicate
regarding their authorizations suggest that mediators should not incorporate
asserted authority limits into end game mediating.' 1  Mediators and
genuinely participating litigants are vulnerable to lies about authority limits
late in mediations if conversations shift from apparent impasse to more
flexible, need-based options.l°2 At these times mediators may rely on these
limited authority lies to encourage ultimately false value-creating
proposals.'0 3 Believing they are promoting joint gain, mediators may help
substitute deception-based outcomes for agreements based on
accommodations of genuine authorizations, interests, and priorities.104
B. MEDIA TING NON-MONETAR Y OPTIONS
Securing attendance of persons capable of avoiding limited authority
negotiation regarding non-monetary resolution options is more challenging
for several reasons. Unlike dollar dimensions of disputes, which usually
reside in one department of institutional or organizational litigants, non-
monetary possibilities frequently touch multiple levels. In addition, the
directions non-monetary discussions may take are inherently fluid and often
result from synergistic interactions between litigants, lawyers, and
mediators. 10 5  Little in pleading and discovery phases of lawsuits focus
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1). This rule prohibits lawyers from
making false statements of law or fact to tribunals. Id. Some Florida mediators are exploring
developing a procedure whereby lawyers certify to courts ordering mediations their compliance with
objective standards as part of the pre-mediation process. Watson, supra note 50. One option would
require lawyers to file written certification describing party representatives who will attend, like the
provision this article recommends, but then go further and affirmatively certifying that attendees will
have full authority to settle. Id. This creates an ethical obligation to avoid lying to courts and may
lessen limited authority claims. Id.
101. Professor and mediator Dwight Golann disagrees and suggests that if necessary, mediators
can use asserted authority limits as a lever to induce agreement. GOLANN, supra note 5, at 178.
Professor Golann does, however, recommend doing this only when mediators "are convinced that a
claimed limit ... affecting a negotiator's authority is real... " Id.
102. See Peters, supra note 12, at 137 (describing similar vulnerabilities regarding lies about
interests or priorities occurring late in mandatory mediations).
103. See Peters, supra note 12, at 137.
104. Id.
105. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 75, at 393-94, 474-86. Negotiation and
mediation scholars urge lawyers and their clients to engage in brainstorming discussions to stimulate
searching for creative resolutions. See, e.g., FISHER, URY & PATRON, supra note 86, at 60-65;
KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 236-50 (3d ed. 2004); PAUL J.
20
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parties on sharing or gathering information about underlying needs,
motivations, and creative resolutions. 10 6 Information from which outside-
the-litigation box solutions can emerge is usually generated only if lawyers
and client representatives share it in the informal, confidential settings that
mediations afford.' 07
Professor Leonard Riskin provided a valuable framework for analyzing
the meaning of full authority for institutional and organizational
representatives in non-monetary contexts. 108 He argued that full mediation
authorization for representatives of these types of litigants should parallel
important decision making components possessed by human clients.' 0 9
These components include adequate knowledge of needs, interests, and
operations; ability to make commitments; discretion to negotiate
arrangements likely to meet approval; and sufficient influence such that their
recommendations are likely to be accepted. 0
This article's proposed standard incorporates Professor Riskin's
suggestions. Recognizing that agencies, entities, institutions, and
organizations may have difficulty finding representatives that embody all of
these criteria, it proposes an alternative for these situations. This alternative
requires that representatives bring either the ability to commit without
further consultation, or the discretion to negotiate and sufficient influence to
make ultimate approval of terms and solutions likely."'
Non-monetary authority limits are not likely to surface early in
mandatory mediations because sessions invariably begin with negotiating
dollar issues raised by the legal remedies in lawsuits."12  The proposed
standard also requires giving at least two weeks' notice for problems, to
ZWIER & THOMAS F. GUERNSEY, ADVANCED NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION THEORY AND
PRACTICE 151-52 (2005).
106. See, e.g., Michael Moffit, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727 (2005). The
scope of discovery is now limited to non-privileged matters relevant to the claims and defenses of all
parties, a standard which does not invite pretrial investigation of underlying needs and interests. See
Fed. R. Civ. P.26(b).
107. See Bush, supra note 12, at 13.
108. Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059 (1991).
109. Riskin, supra note 108, at 1110.
110. Id.
11l. Perhaps a different standard should apply when these types of litigants sue because they
invoke the judicial process and arguably assume the cost of sending representatives authorized to
make commitments on non-monetary solutions.
112. See Peters, supra note 12, at 138.
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comply with the authorized representative obligation. This notice obligation
may motivate added diligence by counsel and their institutional or
organizational clients. It removes surprise, leverage, and other tactical
advantages that accompany limited authority negotiation. Reporting
anticipated limits to courts promotes honesty because the American Bar
Association has concluded that lying about authority violates ethical rules
requiring candid disclosure to tribunals." 3 It also provides opportunities to
discuss non-monetary authorization problems and determine whether it
makes sense to mediate in light of them.
V. APPLYING THIS ARTICLE'S PROPOSED STANDARD
The difficulties of enforcing violations of the proposed standard supply
significant, but not controlling, arguments against adopting it. The proposed
standard's explicit design of providing context-specific notice of what full
authority means, in both monetary and non-monetary contexts, lessens
concerns that lawyers and representatives will face subjective assessments of
their behavior. This article now analyzes remaining concerns of generating
collateral enforcement litigation, and infringing the essential, confidential
essence of the mediation process.
Several factors suggest that enforcement opportunities may not arise
often. Existing data regarding full and partial resolutions at mandatory
mediations suggests that authority limits do not present problems in many,
perhaps most, mandatory mediations."14 In addition, as argued previously,
representatives and lawyers possess the ability to frame authority stymies as
different valuation estimates, or perceptions of controlling facts, law, and
likely outcomes, rather than as authorization limits. These optional frames
produce decisions not to negotiate further by just saying no.
Unlike concerns about other rules mandating ambiguous, uncertain
standards of good faith negotiating behavior, this proposed reform will not
produce opportunities to assert violations if negotiators just say no. Once
lawyers learn to deal with genuine limited authority problems by just saying
no, opportunities to litigate about this standard lessen significantly. The
standard cannot be invoked unless negotiators claim limited authority. If
they really do have limited authority, they can say no regarding further
negotiating, and then get additional authority later if they wish.
113. See ABA Formal Op. 93-370, supra note 98.
114. One mediation program administrator noted that mediators in her program simply accepted
assertions of full settlement authority at face value and that this never presented a problem. Lande,
supra note 10, at 133 n.329.
294
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The proposal's requirement that litigants and lawyers notify others at
least two weeks in advance of scheduled mediations of known authority
limits also reduces opportunities to litigate about enforcement and sanctions.
If complied with, this provision allows the parties and the mediator to seek
solutions for situations presented by authority limits before mandatory
mediations begin. If these issues cannot be resolved between the parties
with the help of their mediator, courts can resolve problems. Doing this
substitutes a problem-solving structure for the adversarial frame that
concerns proponents of good faith standards. This also uses judicial
resources more efficiently than enforcing and sanctioning non-compliance.
If limits present problems too difficult to resolve easily, courts may exempt
matters from required mediation. If easily solvable problems resulting from
insincere or excessively adversarial behavior occur, courts can assess
sanctions in the same way that they punish violations of pretrial discovery
orders. 115
Skilled mediators often use approaches that replicate the proposed
standard and lessen the likelihood of collateral litigation regarding
compliance and enforcement. They frequently initiate conversations with
participants about authority issues in telephone conversations or e-mail
exchanges before convening mediations. 116  These pre-mediation
consultations allow surfacing, discussing, and resolving issues concerning
attendance by sufficiently authorized representatives. " 7  They help
participants develop appropriate expectations and avoid unpleasant surprises
when mediations begin. 118
Pre-mediation consultation frequently leads to execution of agreements
to mediate executed by all participants. " 9 These agreements create mutual
expectations regarding who attends and the authority possessed by
115. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b) (triggering sanctions for demonstrated failures of parties to
comply with court orders issued after motions to compel preceded by good faith conferencing
seeking to resolve issues). Some Florida mediators are starting to explore developing a motion to
defer procedure for sending difficult problems that surface during pre-mediation conferencing and
potentially jeopardize mediating effectiveness. Watson, supra note 50. Educating the bench and bar
to put these kinds of issues on the table and let judges decide them will further restrict abilities of
lawyers and parties to claim limited authority successfully in court-ordered mediations. Id.
116. Most agree that pre-mediation consultations between mediators and participants are
valuable. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 10, at 132. Many mediators regularly use these consultations,
eitherjointly, frequently using conference calls, or separately. Id. at 132 n.32 1.
117. See Lande, supra note 10, at 132 n.321.
118. See Lande, supra note 10, at 132.
119. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 139.
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representatives of agency, entity, institutional, and organizational clients. 120
Two scholars who reviewed more than 1,200 reported court decisions
analyzing aspects of court-connected mediation proposed best practices to
avoid collateral litigation.1 2 1 High on their list was a recommendation that
"mediators and lawyers should be particularly aggressive in insisting that
decisionmakers with clear settlement authority" attend and participate
throughout entire sessions. 122
Litigants and lawyers who do not disclose authority limits in advance
and then engage in limited authority negotiating present difficult challenges.
One important contextual factor in determining how to respond to these
challenges concerns when limited monetary authority negotiation surfaces
during mandatory mediations. Early invocations of limited authority, for
example, suggest use of negotiation tactics to claim value.12 3  Limited
monetary authority claims can provide leverage by creating incentives for
fully authorized negotiators to make additional concessions to satisfy their
counterparts' limits. ' 2 4 It can give asserters of limited authority time to learn
potentially important information while resisting making concessions needed
to generate reasonable momentum toward agreement. It often angers
litigants who came to the session fully prepared to settle, causing them to
feel abused when confronting no authority claims early. 125
Mediators encountering limited authority negotiation early may pursue
the same options they use later when lawyers, human participants, and entity
representatives confront end game evaluation dilemmas. Contexts suggest
that continued conversations may lay useful foundations for building partial
or complete agreements. Many mediators are now using more than one
session to narrow or resolve difficult lawsuits involving large dollar
claims. 126 On the other hand, mediators confronting unprepared adjusters
who showed up only to document their file and other similar contexts, may
120. Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 139.
121. Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 138-43. Noting that "there are no silver bullets to
insulate mediation from litigation," the authors recommend ten "practical steps mediators, lawyers,
and consumers can take" to avoid litigating about issues arising from efforts to avoid litigating. Id.
at 138.
122. Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 142. The authors recommend this "given the
significant body of duty to mediate and sanctions opinions raising issues of attendance and
authority..." Id.
123. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
124. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 245 (4th ed.
2001).
125. E.g., Carter, supra note 57, at 401; GOLANN, supra note 5, at 176.
126. Comment of Jay Fraxedas, Florida mediator (Feb. 7, 2007); see Statistics in Mediation,
supra note 49 (reporting that 15% of 203 mediations between July 2003 and August 2004 took more
than one session).
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appropriately conclude that ending sessions works best. Doing this prevents
further expenditure of time and money by sincere participants. It prevents
the use of mediation unfairly as a discovery device. It also may be
warranted by mediators' duties to ensure that the process is conducted fairly
and in a balanced manner.'27
Later invocations of limited authority may suggest genuine uncertainty
regarding bargaining parameters beyond the margins of planned
authorizations.128 Mediation usually involves discussing different
perspectives regarding evaluations of claims and defenses. Participant
perspectives often shift as additional information emerges during these
conversations. If new or unanticipated information suggests that absent but
ultimate decisionmakers would likely change their views or perspectives,
lawyers and representatives possess several options besides invoking limited
authority. Assuming absent ultimate decisionmakers are readily reachable
by phone, email, or instant messaging, they can consult during breaks. If
that doesn't work, they can just say no to proposals and, if desired and
possible, request resuming mediation in the future. Finally, they can
impasse the mediation and continue negotiating later.
When limited authority claims occur in caucus, mediators can explore
the problems-why they were not anticipated and surfaced before
convening, and what options make sense now. This may give participants
using limited authority as a negotiating tactic a confidential, face-saving way
to discontinue this bargaining gambit. 129 It may also reveal that the litigants'
127. Mediators are "responsible for safeguarding the mediation process." FLA. R. FOR CERT.
AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS § 10.400. This rule further notes that "the benefits of the
process are best achieved if the mediation is conducted in an informed, balanced, and timely
fashion." Id.
128. Lawyers and others who are not actual decisionmakers must clarify the important question
of their authority before making commitments because many states hold that their status as
representatives carries no apparent authority to bind their clients. Florida, for example, follows this
rule for lawyers. See, e.g., Fivecoat v. Publix Supermarkets, 928 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006); Sharick v. Se. Univ. Health Sciences, Inc., 891 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
Weitzman v. Bergman, 555 So. 2d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Making commitments without
authorization, followed by their clients' refusal to honor them, can expose them to malpractice
liability and destroy their future credibility and effectiveness. See generally COOLEY, supra note 4,
at 72.
129. See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S. G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 123-24
(1996) (recommending caucuses if participants seriously misbehave during mediations); SLAIKEU,
supra note 41, at 234-36 (describing tactful ways to confront participants regarding negotiation
behaviors that are destructive to the process); OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE, Final Draft Standard VI, Comment 2 (revised April 23, 2005),
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real intentions are not to negotiate. Poorly prepared participants claiming
limited authority may really be asserting that they do not accept evaluations
and wish to say no to them. Clarifying whether situations involve desires
not to negotiate further, or the existence of genuine authority limits helps
mediators decide what to do next. Difficult choices about what to do next
arise only when participants clearly indicated they based decisions only on
authority limits rather than on evaluation or perception differences.
When limited authority negotiating occurs late in mediation, recessing
or adjourning sessions to provide opportunities to pursue additional
authorizations may make sense. Refraining limited authority claims to just
saying no, and if necessary, ending mediations, also supply viable options.
By this time, participants have talked and listened to each other so future
negotiations can be more informed if they occur. Not all problems that
might constitute rule violations require mediator whistle-blowing. 30
If limited authority is revealed in caucus early in mediations, mediators
may draw on earlier conversations and assessments of relevant context
factors to predict whether foundations for future negotiating either within or
outside mediation are likely to result from sharing further information
without bargaining.' 3' If they conclude yes, they can then suggest this
course to all participants. If mediators conclude that this course would not
be useful, or if participants do not agree with this proposed direction,
mediators may then end sessions.
Unless mediators feel that doing this is contextually inappropriate, they
can end sessions without sharing the specific reasons underlying their
judgment that further mediation is not warranted. A mediator's choice not to
disclose caucus assertions of authority limits lessons likelihoods of
enforcement and sanction proceedings. It also avoids raising confidentiality
issues that arise if mediators are asked to testify about these caucus
communications in later proceedings.
A mediator's choice not to share limited authority claim probably falls
within the range of nondisclosure generally accepted in caucus-based
mediations. 132 Whether this choice imperils the mediator's impartiality is
http://www.mediate.com/oma/docs/2005CoreStandardsFina]P.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2007)
(stating that mediators must encourage participants to alter offending conduct).
130. See Lande, supra note 10, at 128 (arguing that terminating mediations in the presence of
inappropriate behaviors should suffice in most instances).
131. Time can be productively spent discussing upcoming litigation issues, such as the topics
frequently canvassed in pretrial conferences, even if participants do not negotiate at mandatory
mediations. See Stoehr v.Yost, 765 N.E.2d 684, 688-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c);
Lande, supra note 10, at 133.
132. See Robert D. Benjamin, The Mediator as Trickster: The Folkloric Figure as Professional
Role Model, 13 MEDIATION Q. 131, 136 (1995) (arguing that mediators must recognize the necessity
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debatable. This choice deprives other participants only of collateral
adversarial tools that may not convey negotiation advantages even if they
result in successful imposition of sanctions.
Limited bargaining assertions that occur in joint session give other
participants knowledge independent of mediator disclosures. These
participants may then decide to impose sanctions. Enforcement and
sanctions may also occur if mediators disclose limited authority claims made
in caucus or report it to courts. Unlike broad good faith standards which
require subjective, time-consuming, detailed analysis of participants'
substantive bargaining behaviors, sanctioning for violating the proposed
standard looks only at the specific factual question of whether litigants
invoked limited authority.
The proposed standard does not require mediators to report violations to
courts. Some systems prohibit this. For example, Florida's Mediator Ethics
Advisory Committee has decided that mediators may not report that a
participant lacked full authority even though the litigant claimed full
authority to the judge before the mediation.'33
Enforcement and sanction actions will occur only if participants initiate
based on joint session limited authority claims, or mediators disclose or
report which might prompt courts to initiate. Any of these may generate
efforts to compel mediators to testify regarding whether limited authority
claims occurred. Despite extensive efforts to create confidentiality
protections deemed essential to mediation's success, reported court decisions
of constructive uses of deception within limits to help parties make self-determined decisions); John
W. Cooley, Defining the Ethical Limits ofAcceptable Deception in Mediation, 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL.
L. J. 263, 265 (2004) (discussing that the central paradox of caucused mediation is that parties agree
to be deceived as a condition of participating); but see James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A
Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 77 (2004) (arguing that litigants without counsel and
unsophisticated consumers are unaware victims of tricks of influence used against them by
mediators).
133. Mediator Ethics Advisory Op. 2006-003 (July 24, 2006), http://www.flcourts.org/ (search
"Search" for "MEAC Opinion 2006-003"; then follow "Advisory Opinion MEAC..." hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007). The Florida mediation ethics opinion that held mediators could not
report failures to appear with full authority concluded that this did not fall within an exception to
Florida's general confidentiality rule. See supra, note 137. It interpreted FLA R. Civ. P. 1.730(a) as
allowing mediator's only to report the lack of an agreement without additional comments or
recommendations. It also concluded that this did not fall within the six exceptions provided in the
Florida mediation confidentiality statute. See FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(1)-(6) (2005).
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show that mediator testimony is often compelled or introduced without
objection in similar contexts. 134
If mediators are subpoenaed to testify when sanctions are sought for
violating the proposed standard, they should limit their testimony to the
objective factual question of whether participants asserted limited bargaining
authority negotiating during the mediation.135  This underscores the
importance of mediators' using caucuses to clarify ambiguities regarding
limited authority assertions.
If called as witnesses, mediators should not testify regarding their
subjective thought processes or mental impressions. They should not share
personal speculations regarding the thought process, motives, and
negotiating strategies employed by participants in connection with limited
authority claims or any other negotiation behaviors. 136
Following these limits minimizes participant concerns that, except for
prohibiting limited authority bargaining, their negotiation strategies and
actions implementing them will provide ammunition for adversaries in
sanctioning processes. 137  It also suggests that only failure to bring fully
authorized participants to mediations should be sanctioned. Sanctioning
processes should not encompass failures to notify of authority problems in
advance because they can be mooted by proper mediation behaviors.
Limiting mediator testimony to the objective question of whether a
limited authority statement was made during the mediation reduces the
incursion on the confidential character of caucus communications in
mandatory mediations. The proposed standard's clear directions lessen
134. In their review of 1,223 cases that implicated mediation issues in the five-year period from
1999 to 2003, Professors Coben and Thompson found that "uncontested mediation disclosures
occurred in thirty percent" of these decisions. Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 59. This
included "forty-five opinions in which mediators offered testimony, sixty-five opinions were others
offered evidence about mediators' statements or actions, and 266 opinions where parties or lawyers
offered evidence of their own mediation communications and conduct-all without objection or
comment" regarding confidentiality. Id. These finding caused them to conclude that "the walls of
the mediation room are remarkably transparent." Id.
135. Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 136-37 (arguing that "mediator testimony is most
appropriate if limited to objective matters such as statements made, party comments, and documents
to the extent such evidence is offered and relevant for one of the exceptions to mediation
privilege.").
136. Coben & Thompson, supra note 51, at 136-37 (arguing that "purely subjective evidence
such as the mediator's thought process, mental impressions, or speculation on the thought processes
of others is rarely necessary and should be absolutely prohibited as utterly corruptive of the
mediator's promise of neutrality.").
137. See Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 1-2 (arguing that rules authorizing sanctions
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uncertainties that participants face regarding what can subject them to
potential adverse testimony by mediators in sanction proceedings. 138
In addition, permitting occasional enforcement of this rule by sanctions
is more likely to engender trust than distrust of mandatory mediation.
139
Occasional enforcement of this standard signals that everyone who
negotiates should either bring full authorization to mediations or just say no.
Sanctioning occasional, egregious violations of the proposed standard also
should encourage, rather than impair, public confidence in the process.
140
Critics might argue that adopting and enforcing the proposed standard
will stimulate inappropriate behavior by participants and mediators.
41
Adopting and applying the proposed standard, however, is more likely to
stimulate appropriate behavior by participants and mediators. Implementing
the proposed standard should encourage lawyers to consult with their clients
effectively before mandatory mediations.
Courts have approved requirements that lawyers and clients work
together before mediation by compelling preparation and submission of
written memoranda in advance of mandatory sessions. 142  Effective
negotiating requires preparation, 143 and so does effective representation of
138. This is another concern expressed by the Dispute Resolution Section's Resolution. Good
Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 2 (arguing that "giving courts... broad authority to sanction
types of subjective behaviors does not provide participants with clear understandings of what
behavior is sanctionable.").
139. See Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 1.
140. See Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 1-2 (arguing that sanctioning only
objectively determinable conduct promotes the "public's perception of the legitimacy of mediation
as a consensual, flexible, creative, party-driven process to resolve disputes").
141. See Good Faith Resolution, supra note 16, at 2.
142. Courts have consistently found violations and imposed sanctions in situations where
parties have failed to provide required pre-mediation memorandums. See, e.g., Lande, supra note
10, at 84; Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061-62 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (requiring a
memorandum); aff'd, 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001). Unlike violations of a general good faith
requirement, failures to comply with these rules present objectively determinable behavior that can
be sanctioned. In a study of four federal court-connected mediation programs, 80% of the lawyers
responding said that mediators required written pre-mediation submissions, 71% said this practice
was helpful, and only 1% indicated the practice was detrimental. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL..,
IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 368
(1996).
143. See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 75, at 406 (contending that effective
negotiating is a by-product of sound planning and preparation); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING
FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 15-16 (1999) (noting that
nearly every research study on negotiation has confirmed the importance of preparation); URY,
supra note 86, at 16 (arguing the secret of effective negotiation is prepare, prepare, prepare).
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clients in mediations.'44 Mediation participants who prepare for sessions are
more likely to commit to making the process successful, as well as generate
more personal understanding of the benefits available from such success. 1
45
Research suggests that parties are more likely to settle and feel the mediation
process is fair when they are prepared by their attorneys. 146 The proposed
standard's implicit obligation to do the necessary work to prepare full
authorizations to negotiate is not meaningfully different from assembling
required written memoranda.
Because the directions non-monetary conversations may go are so
diverse and unpredictable, lawyers may need to insist that ultimate
decisionmakers make themselves accessible for consultation during
mediations. Just saying no to non-monetary proposals that promise mutual
benefit because specific authority is limited seems more harmful than doing
so on monetary issues. Earlier monetary predictions may prove sound, and
winning litigation usually offers a way to equal or perhaps better dollar
offers made during a mediation. Generally the only way to ensure getting
everything desired monetarily in litigation contexts is to endure the expenses
and other costs of trial, succeed, and then collect resulting judgments. Non-
monetary solutions, however, typically have no readily available alternative.
Trying cases usually does not provide remotely analogous ways to
accomplish components of non-monetary proposals.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although no set of rules eliminates all problematic negotiation
behaviors and guarantees productive bargaining in mediations, the proposed
standard seeks to discourage use of a specific, objectively determinable
action. It creates an approach sensitive to the different contexts presented by
value-claiming and value-creating bargaining that are designed to minimize
limited authority negotiating.
This proposed standard follows recommendations that mandatory
mediations should include approaches that balance legitimate interests of
courts, parties, and mediators. 14  This standard acknowledges judicial
interests in ensuring that mandatory mediations promote opportunities for
valuable conversations by designing a context specific rule to encourage
144. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 10, at 129; Kovach, supra note 23, at 622; Weston, supra note
23, at 628.
145. Lande, supra note 10, at 129 n.310.
146. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know
from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 641, 676. 687, 698-99 (2002).
147. See Lande, supra note 10, at 112-17.
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attendance by fully authorized representatives.148 It creates an expectation
that authorized representatives will attend and humans often respond to the
expectations of others. 149 Creating this clear rule may help lawyers and
representatives adapt and change non-complying behaviors. Lawyers, at
least, "are generally familiar with rules and comfortable measuring their
actions" against them. '50
This proposed standard respects the broad discretion that lawyers and
participants possess to decide how they want to negotiate and then act
accordingly. Except for prohibiting limited authority bargaining, the
proposed standard does not affect how participants choose to present and
argue positions and interests, what information to reveal and not reveal,
whether to make offers and counteroffers, how to value claims, and whether
to settle. It does not prohibit use of hardball negotiation tactics such as
extreme offers and failing to make concessions."'5 It does not prohibit other
deceptive negotiation actions such as making false statements about
settlement intentions, claim valuations, opinions, interests, agreement
alternatives, and priorities. 152
This standard also respects participant interests by prohibiting only
invocations of limited negotiating authority. Acknowledging that agency,
entity, institutional, and organizational participants occasionally may have
realistic difficulties providing fully empowered representatives in both
contexts, this standard permits them to just say no rather than trying to gain a
potentially unfair bargaining advantage by asserting limited negotiating
authority. Following established doctrine, this standard clarifies that
participants who are not able to secure full authorization or secure
exemption from mediating can appear and indicate their intention not to
bargain. They can also talk about topics other than economic and non-
monetary resolutions as long as they do not invoke limited authority. The
issue of whether representatives are fully authorized will not arise unless
participants create it.
This standard targets the objective, easy determination of whether
negotiators have invoked limited bargaining authority. By doing so, it
148. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
149. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE, & PAUL R. TREMBLAY,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 29 (2d ed. 2004); RAYMOND L.
GORDON, INTERVIEWING: STRATEGY, TECHNIQUES, AND TACTICS 84 (1998).
150. See Peters, supra note 12, at 141.
151. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 24-25.
152. See Peters, supra note 12, at 128-30, 133-37.
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provides clear guidance and removes uncertainty about what actions are
prohibited. It also creates a narrow incursion on the confidentiality
dimensions of mandatory mediations if mediators are subpoenaed to testify.
It minimizes fears that neutrals, impartially seeking to help parties negotiate,
may testify later about subjective impressions they have concerning aspects
of negotiating behaviors they did not like.
Several factors constrain the likelihood that this proposed standard will
spawn extensive sanctioning proceedings. It is clear, not ambiguous. It rests
on objectively determinable behavior. Authority limits are likely to be
disclosed in caucuses. This enhances appropriate decisionmaking about how
to proceed, and lessens the likelihood of potential angry, adversarial
responses seeking enforcement and sanctions for other negotiating tactics
typically performed face-to-face.
The proposed standard also encourages framing authority problems as
purposeful negotiation decisions rather than as efforts to exploit sincere
participants or circumvent applicable rules. This perspective leads to
possibilities that lawyers and institutional or organizational litigants will
understand and accept the challenges involved in complying. Anything that
encourages lawyers and their clients to prepare more for negotiating and
mediating is advantageous.
The proposed standard advances mediators' interests in several ways. It
eliminates ambiguities existing in present requirements and definitions of
full authority. Its fourteen-day notice provision and clear-but-flexible
approach to non-monetary issue authorization for institutional and
organizational litigants enhance mediators' abilities to identify, discuss, and
possibly resolve problems before mediations. It validates the common
practice of using agreements to mediate to coordinate expectations and
reduce surprise before mediations begin. If it successfully removes non-
authority negotiating, it helps mediators fulfill their professional obligations
to create and promote a fair and balanced negotiation process.
Courts generally cannot promote productive negotiation behavior by
rule and sanction, but limited authority negotiating is a problematic behavior
that can be minimized. What is gained if non-authorized lawyers and
representatives simply say no instead of using limited authority negotiating?
The minimization of limited authority as a bargaining ploy is gained. More
integrity in the mediation process is gained. More preparation for the
mediation process is probably gained. More accurate contexts for successful
mediation conversations that narrow or resolve disputes, and give
participants opportunities to communicate more fully about more topics than
trial procedures and evidence doctrines allow, are probably gained.
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It sounds like large gain with relatively minimal cost. Legislatures and
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